




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
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**The New Germany in
a New Europe
The Domestic Political
Dimension**

Lieutenant Colonel
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U. S. Air Force



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THE NEW GERMANY IN A NEW EUROPE

The Domestic Political Dimension

This paper investigates the political environment of Germany since reunification and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Significant aspects of German society are discussed including Germany's history, strength of its democratic institutions, education, integration of the East, guestworkers and refugees, and German tendencies toward nationalism, patriotism and Europeanism. The paper concludes with a discussion of future implications for U.S. policy. At issue is whether Germany should be feared or embraced; and what role the U.S. should and can play in guiding Germany toward satisfaction of its national interests, as well as our own, in the decades ahead.

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THE NEW GERMANY IN A NEW EUROPE
The Domestic Political Dimension

With reunification in 1990, Germany, already an economic powerhouse, is once again emerging onto the world stage as a potential power to be reckoned with. Moreover, the recent events in Europe and what was the Soviet Union have completely changed the look of that part of the world and present the United States with special challenges in the future. In particular, the collapse of the Soviet empire in conjunction with the reunification of Germany has markedly enhanced Germany's importance in European and world affairs.

These recent world events have forced the United States to rethink present and future relationships with countries throughout the world, but especially Germany. Germany is probably the only country on earth, except possibly Japan, which possesses the economic, political and military potential to threaten the United States in the years ahead. Consequently, it is in the United States' interest to design a national policy which minimizes any potential threat from Germany, while, at the same time, exploiting and maximizing all potential avenues of bilateral economic, political and military cooperation. If they are to succeed, the designers of such a policy will need to improve their understanding of contemporary Germany. That effort requires a review of Germany's historical experience and internal political environment--a review that should reveal certain dichotomies in its

culture which largely shape German values and traditions and affect the approach of Germans to issues and problems both inside and outside their borders.

Burden of the Past - An Historical Perspective

Of course, when one considers Germany, one is immediately confronted with the age old "German question." While some would argue the German question is exclusively the preserve of the Germans, many others would argue that it has always been a broader European issue.¹ As Daniel Hamilton wrote in the Journal of International Affairs, "Whether weak and fragmented or strong and tempted to domination, Germany, das Land in der Mitte, has remained the hinge of Europe's security - and its insecurities."²

The revolutionary and dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 changed Germany from a divided nation with adversaries on its eastern borders, to a unified central power. A power with friendly and prosperous, yet weaker nations to the west, and friendly yet fragile, newly freed nations to the east. The new unified Germany now appears to be performing a balancing act between fostering integration in the west, and trying to curb disintegration in the east.³

As Germany grapples with its new role as the central power in Europe, it must walk a fine line between those who believe Germany should assume the appropriate economic, political and military responsibilities commensurate with its new importance, and those who are fearful of a potentially dominant Germany.

Recognizing these concerns, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has worked hard to counter them by emphasizing that Germany's aim is not to create a German Europe, but to create a European Germany. Some feel the reality will likely be some of both.⁴

The very idea that Germany is Europe's central power conjures up memories of Germany's unsuccessful attempts to perform earlier balancing acts between East and West; and that image remains for many. But, both Germany and Europe have changed and are significantly different from what they were in the past.

First, Germany is content territorially, having relinquished all claims to any former German territories. Second, Germany has vowed to never "produce, possess, or control nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and has agreed to limit its armed forces to 370,000 personnel. Third, the Germans have gained not just their unity but unity in freedom. Fourth, unification was achieved with the acceptance of Germany's neighbors, not against their opposition."⁵

Germans themselves view their history in very different ways, causing both generational and political frictions. The central issue is whether or not Germany has learned history's lessons. And there are those who insist that if any lesson is to be learned it is that a "unified, powerful Germany is inherently dangerous."⁶ The issue has spurred political debate, with the Greens, older Social Democrats, and others convinced that a large, powerful Germany is potentially bad: that somehow once

Germans accumulate power and sovereignty, that a sort of "German psyche" takes over and power corrupts them. These people believe that Germany could once again embark on hegemonistic policies.⁷

Beyond the internal German debate over their history and its implications for the future, non-Germans hold their own wary views of German history and future possibilities based on that history. As Bowman Miller wrote in Europe in Transition, "history, for Germans is too often an albatross or a bludgeon, imposed or wielded by non-Germans."⁸ Miller's cure for this is for Germans to confront their past head on, gaining, in the process, a healthier and more sovereign society, and the world's respect. On the other hand, Miller suggests that, if Germans attempt to reinterpret or skirt their past, they will be severely criticized around the world. He goes on to say that "a united Germany will aspire to be respected in the world, not feared. A key to achieving that lies in a direct approach to an imperfect past as a unified German state moves into a promising, assertive future."⁹ In an article appearing in the New York Times, Flora Lewis wrote about the 1985 trip of President Reagan to Bitburg. The visit illustrated that the German craving for forgiveness for past misdeeds was still strong. But, as she noted, "no one can grant absolution, including President Reagan."¹⁰ In another article, Richard Cohen characterized the Germans as viewing themselves as "inordinately respectful of authority, as lacking the spontaneity and the talent for chaos that, for instance, afflicts Poland."¹¹ Conversely, Cohen stated, "others see (Ger-

mans) as a most unpredictable and dangerous people - proprietors of a vast Bates Motel," adding "Little wonder, then, that NATO is often said to have three goals for Europe: To keep the Russians out, the Americans in - and the Germans down." He further notes that France, which had lost three wars to Germany in the past 118 years, and England, which had two wars with Germany this century, were not overly enthusiastic about a united Germany. In the end both countries did acquiesce; but their concern remains, but Cohen pointed out, "if the military potential of a reunited Germany is not enough to give Europe the willies, then its economic potential almost certainly is. A united Germany would be a economic behemoth, combining West Europe's most impressive economy with the East's."¹²

Such considerations highlight two issues: 1) that Germany has a rather dark side to its past, and 2) that a unified Germany is a power which will need to find its place in the world order. The United States will have to confront both of these issues, if we hope to guide what the new world order will look like as well as the way in which members of that new world order will interact.

It is curious that Germany (since 1945), while seeming to purposely avoid global ambition, has accidentally made itself into a global power through its quiet, miraculous economic prosperity. The trouble is that now Germans must determine what kind of power they want to be. Some argue that the new Germany that is emerging is "stable, cautious, dedicated to private pursuits rather

than public crusades."¹³ On the whole, I tend to agree with an editorial in the Wall Street Journal which read, in part, "Germany may prove a maddening ally. It may be slow to pitch in with global efforts such as the defeat of Saddam Hussein. But the fact remains that Germany today is a much-changed political entity. The reunified Germany is a land that promotes individual freedom and human happiness."¹⁴

Strength of Democracy

Considering that Germans had never really lived in a true or stable democracy until it was imposed on western Germany by the Allied powers after World War II, one must wonder whether their democratic society will hold up under the present strains of German reunification, and the political and economic collapse of eastern Europe.

Since May 23, 1949, when the Federal Republic of Germany was formed and its Constitution (also called Basic Law) ratified, the Germans have flourished under their democratic system.¹⁵ Of course, one might argue that it was with Allied help that the Germans rebuilt their now-thriving economy and that it is this thriving economy that underpins German popular support for their democratic institutions.

Regardless of the reason, it is true that western German democracy has worked for the past 43 years. Nevertheless, the question remains as to the future course of German politics and political institutions. In discussions with Mr. Dieter Dettke,

Executive Director of the Washington office of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation and prominent member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and Mr. Claus Gramckow, a member of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), both agreed that democracy remains strong in the reunified Germany. They see no trends toward political extremism on the part of any major political party in Germany and, in fact, contend that all the major political parties are moving closer to the center of the German political spectrum, reflecting a more moderate, balanced approach by all the parties.¹⁶ This does not mean, however, that there are not significant differences between the parties; but before discussing some of those differences, I will describe the parties and place them in an historical perspective.

Traditionally, political representation in West Germany was primarily made up by three main political parties: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) coalition, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Other small political parties have existed, and some still exist, but none really had or have much influence on German politics. (The one possible exception is the Greens who will be discussed later). If one were to place the main parties along a political spectrum, the SPD would be placed to the left of center (more liberal), the FDP at the center, and the CDU/CSU to the right of center (more conservative).

Historically, federal leadership of West Germany has swung between the CDU/CSU, from 1949 to mid-1960s, and from the early

1980s to the present, and the SPD, from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. The FDP has never been a majority party, but with a membership of nearly 10 percent of the electorate, they historically have provided the swing vote, joining in coalition with either the CDU/CSU or SPD. As a result, the FDP has been and will likely continue to be a major power broker in German politics.¹⁷ (a concomitant of this role is the longevity of the party's leader, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in the Foreign Minister's job--eighteen years under SPD and CDU/CSU chancellors alike. This translates into a remarkable continuity and consistency in German foreign policy.) Since the early 1980s and through reunification, the CDU/CSU in coalition with the FDP has been in power at the federal level with the CDU/CSU presently holding 39 percent of the electorate and the FDP holding 8 percent of the electorate. The SPD represents 39 percent of the population with the remaining 14 percent undecided or affiliated with splinter groups (recent data obtained from a poll taken by the Politbarometer, December 1991, published by Sorschungsgruppe Wahlen in Mannheim).¹⁸

Indications are that the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition will remain intact at the federal level through the national elections scheduled for 1994. The SPD concedes that their only hope at the federal level would be if the FDP broke their coalition with the CDU/CSU and joined them. However, indications are that such an outcome is unlikely to occur.¹⁹

Prior to reunification and the collapse of communism throughout eastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union, some of the more fundamental differences between the major parties had to do with the possibility of German reunification and building a relationship with the Eastern bloc. But since these issues have now disappeared, the German political parties appear to be in agreement on a large majority of issues affecting German politics. All the parties desire a continued strong alliance with the United States through NATO and the CSCE, including an American military presence in Europe. Additionally, all parties are strongly in favor of the EC and the continued Europeanization of Germany. Finally, all parties are strongly supportive of advancing democratic principles and free market economies throughout Europe and elsewhere.²⁰

Differences between the parties have to do less with German foreign policy than with domestic issues including abortion, taxes and asylum seekers. The SPD supports abortion rights for women, which is not surprising considering 40 percent of the party is made up of women. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition is generally against abortion, reflecting their more conservative view and Catholic influence. As for taxes, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition implemented a one-time 5 percent increase to the income tax in 1991 to pay for reunification; but with reunification costs increasing, they are now pushing a permanent follow on 1 percent increase to the VAT, from 14 to 15 percent. The SPD is firmly opposed to this tax increase. Concerning asylum seekers, the

CDU/CSU-FDP coalition is in favor of further restrictions on them, including on ethnic Germans; the SPD, however, has opposed such a move.²¹

Religion and environmentalism are two other important influences on German politics. Germany is predominantly Lutheran (nearly 80 percent of the population), but a strong and vocal Catholic minority (about 20 percent of the population) resides in southern Germany. For the most part, there is much agreement between the religious ideologies; abortion, however, is a subject on which there is great disagreement. On that issue, Catholics and many conservative Germans represented by the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition are adamantly opposed; whereas the SPD, representing greater numbers of women, minorities and the middle class, is in favor of abortion.

The Greens, who represent extreme views on environmental issues and pacifism, represent nearly 9 percent of the population, but their influence has waned with reunification and the demise of communism in the East. Moreover, the major political parties have generally adopted the more moderate views that the Greens have espoused in the past. The result is that, as a political entity, the Greens have less influence. It can be argued with some validity, however, that there has been a general "greening" of all the major German political parties. The removal of nuclear weapons from German soil, the reduction in nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, and the earnest efforts by the West to promote peace and stability while attempt-

ing to clean up the environment-all result in a much smaller constituency for the militant Greens. Once again, if there is any single trait that marks the character of future German politics it is moderation - the tendency to take a progressive, yet balanced political approach to all issues - foreign and domestic. Such a forecast bodes well for the future of U.S.-German political relations, with little chance of alienation between these two great democratic countries.²²

Education

The Germans discovered long ago that a top notch educational system is a prerequisite to a top notch economy, and obviously the corollary; that a less than best educational system results in a second-rate economy.²³ Most would agree that Germany possesses a strong, thriving world class economy, but few might recognize that one of the reasons is Germany's superb educational system. What is it that makes the German system so effective?

First, Germans divide up their children according to their abilities and aptitudes early on, prior to entering secondary school. At about 10 years of age, German children are divided into one of three types of schools: main schools or Gymnasium (similar to British secondary schools); intermediate schools or Handelsschule (a more technical school but offering a broader curricula); and grammar schools or Volksschule. Obviously the curricula varies from highly academic to more generally vocational. Only five percent of German children attend a comprehensive

school; whereas in Britain the percent is ninety percent. The Germans have found that their system is much better than either ours or the British at educating and motivating their children. The best indicator is the high-school drop-out rate which stands at 10 percent in Germany, as compared to 45 percent in Britain and a comparable figure in the United States.²⁴ My personal opinion is, however, that while the Germans do a better job than us at providing their people with the skills necessary to perform in the workplace, we are much better at training students to be independent thinkers and inculcating democratic principles in our students strengthening our democratic institutions and way of life.

Second, they avoid over-specialization in their training. No German youth can earn a certificate (equivalent to a high school diploma) without achieving a minimum standard in core subjects: mathematics, science, German, and (for most) a foreign language.²⁵

Third, Germans treat teachers with much respect, and as bona fide members of the professional middle class. Overall, German teachers are the best paid in the world. For example, a 35 year old teacher with two children earns roughly \$51,000 a year.²⁶ Additionally, teachers enjoy several important perks: "security of tenure (teachers are part of the civil service), generous hours (school day lasts from 8 am to 1 pm), and a high social status (a teacher is an important figure in the local community,

with a formal title to prove it). The result is that teaching is a difficult profession to get into."²⁷

Fourth, Germans provide their future workers with high quality training. Those students not headed for university (about three-fourths of all students) are required to pursue an apprenticeship for three or more years. During this period, they spend a couple of days a week at a vocational school studying the theory of their trade, along with some core academic subjects. For the remainder of the week, they are involved in on-the-job training at a business, directly under the tutelage of a "master" trainer. Although these students receive very little compensation during their apprenticeship (about 25 percent of what a fully qualified worker gets), they know they cannot get a proper job until they have completed the apprenticeship and passed a rigorous theoretical and practical exam. If successful, these students receive a certificate and are then able to immediately become productive members of the workforce.²⁸

I think it is important to point out that German schooling is more serious than ours - which is a direct reflection of their schools being more business-like and career-oriented than ours. Another important difference is that Germany has no vocational high schools like those in the United States. In Germany, all vocational training (apprenticeships) is done by German employers at their place of business. The most immediately apparent difference is that students are taught by a master craftsman as opposed to a "school teacher." In the German educational system,

the educators, business, and the government are closely interlocked. German employers provide and pay for apprenticeship training, while the state governments set the standards.²⁹ The result is that Germany educates their workers for specialized fields far better than most countries. This is especially the case since they emphasize theoretical as well as practical training, which provides a better foundation for their workers to broaden and deepen skills. Moreover, German companies provide their employees continuous in-company training to further develop skills, as well as to position themselves to react more effectively to changes in the product and in increasingly sophisticated technological changes. The end result is a highly skilled workforce with the ability to adapt to a changing economic environment; and this has a multiplier effect on the entire German economy.³⁰

Although Germany's educational system is superb, it does have two distinct shortcomings. First, at the university level they are weak in the social sciences and management fields. Second, with reunification Germany is confronted with the burden of massive retraining requirements for the East Germans, as the former East German economy goes through the transformation from a planned economy to a market economy.

In exploring the reason behind the first flaw, one must ask: if the German educational system is so superb, why is it that they have deficiencies in their social sciences and management fields? The answer is that the German educational system at all

levels, including the university level, emphasizes the technical sciences and engineering. This provides a strong foundation for their thriving economy; however, it is done without providing sufficient grounding in non-technical areas. In fact, German companies frequently hire foreign personnel to fill positions in the social sciences and management fields. Apparently, this is the reason why Germany is weak in market-intensive and services sectors of the world market.³¹

The second flaw, the burden of massive job retraining efforts due to reunification has proven to be a very expensive proposition for the Germans and will continue to be costly and complicated in the foreseeable future. After reunification, many East Germans found that their qualifications and skills were insufficient to hold a job in a modern "Western" industrial economy. Some experts conclude that "of the eight million people employed in the former GDR at least every second person must be professionally reoriented, in order to improve his chances in the labor market."³²

To alleviate this problem, the Federal Labor Institute instituted a reeducation and qualification program for the eastern Germans. For 1991 alone, 6.7 billion German marks [DM] are allotted in its [the federal government] budget for further professional education and retraining measures. Some 550,000 employees, who would otherwise be threatened with unemployment, are expected to profit from these funds.³³

Beyond formal educational institutions, many initiatives are underway for former GDR businesses to provide education and training to their employees, while the businesses concurrently make the necessary changes to enable them to compete in a market economy. The benefit is that those employees trained can then remain and help the business more effectively compete and make the transformation to a market economy.³⁴

Whether these measures will be completely successful remains to be seen; but it is clear that the Germans are working hard to overcome the massive job retraining requirements due to reunification and the near-collapse of what was East German industry. What is also clear is that the Germans are making significant progress in their efforts.

Integrating The East

Although German reunification is a miraculous event which is a triumph for the German people and for those supporting democratic principles around the world, the process is proving to be terribly expensive-and not just in terms of job retraining. The German federal government was expected to pour \$80 billion into the eastern states in 1991 alone. The financial and social costs are especially worrisome, since these factors could serve to undermine German political stability - a hallmark of German politics since World War II.³⁵

Business confidence in eastern German industry has improved somewhat, but many problems remain. According to one projection, by 1992, jobs in eastern Germany will be down to 6 million, which equates to unemployment rates somewhere between 20 to 28 percent.³⁶ A recent study by the Institute of German Economy in Cologne indicates that unemployment will be somewhat dampened by government, social, and labor market policy, as well as expected migration and commuter movements.³⁷ However, if unemployment really does get out of hand, there would most likely be significant turmoil among the population.

Other sources forecast total costs of unification to be somewhere between \$600 billion and \$1 trillion over this decade. In addition, they state that the eastern economy is so bad that it is now suffering a depression, with a major gap between living standards in the east and the west—a gap that has only widened since unification.³⁸ Although these forecasts are possibly an exaggeration of the situation, it is true that many economic indicators reflect severe economic problems. Unemployment could reach as high as 50 percent in eastern Germany, investment is still sluggish, property claims remain unresolved, and output is expected to drop by over 40 percent. Only now is the political, economic and financial leadership in western Germany coming to realize the sheer size of the costs of reunification.³⁹

Given the severity of the eastern German economic collapse, some German industry experts are calling for patience by the German people and forecast eastern German economic recovery,

including an efficient industrial structure in four to seven years.⁴⁰

As for the western part of the economy, it is slowing - with real GNP growth forecasted to be 2.6 percent in 1991, or roughly half the output of 1990. But there are some positive signs that the economy will improve slightly in 1992, with a forecasted 2.9 percent real GNP growth. (In the eastern part of the economy, the forecast is for a continued fall of 15 to 20 percent in real GNP for 1991, but with a possible bottoming out by 1992).⁴¹ New orders are picking up again in some sectors of the economy such as construction. This is especially encouraging, since it reflects progress being made in both industrial and infrastructure redevelopment, which many argue is a prerequisite to overall industrial recovery. Some would contend, however, that the federal government will need to run deficits of DM200 billion or more for the next few years to get the economy on track.⁴²

As the economy has worsened in eastern Germany, many have migrated to western Germany to find employment. This problem has been exacerbated by the economic collapse of eastern Europe. The result is an unemployment rate in western Germany of 6.3 percent (2nd Quarter of 1991) and the possibility of it getting worse. With nearly 300,000 immigrants a year, and an even higher number of internal immigrants (commuters from the eastern states), western Germany is confronted with the need to create 600,000 jobs annually just to keep unemployment from rising.⁴³ According to one estimate, it would take 3 million jobs right now in the

eastern states to absorb those unemployed and those on short-time working hours.⁴⁴

Beyond unemployment, inflation is another problem in the eastern states and it is more difficult to solve than in the western states. In May 1991 inflation in the east stood at 11 percent. Unfortunately, the government program to phase out subsidies in the eastern states is inflationary and expected to continue for the next two years. Also, wage increases in the east will be inflationary, as the unions' primary goal is to equalize western and eastern wages by 1994 (For example, engineers in the east make 62.5 percent of their counterparts' salary in the west).⁴⁵

To counter these domestic economic concerns, the Treuhandanstalt, an organization created by the German federal government in Autumn 1990, has been charged with administering and privatizing the eastern Germany economy including eastern German industries, with the goal being that the economy will make a turnaround. In its second year of operation, the Treuhand is finally making some headway. It has audited over half of the 10,000 firms in eastern Germany, audits the absence of which heretofore had been a major obstacle to potential buyer interest. In addition, it is providing needed funds to reinvigorate small and medium sized firms throughout eastern Germany.⁴⁶

Given the severe economic problems that now confront Germany since unification, it is not surprising to see social problems surfacing between east and west Germans after 45 years of separa-

tion. As one source put it "we are one state with two completely different societies. Germans from the west speak of eastern Germany, as if it were still a foreign country."⁴⁷ West Germans look down on their east German brothers and sisters for a wide variety of reasons, but especially because of a perceived lack of entrepreneurship and industriousness on the part of the easterners.

Obviously, the West German government recognized that there would be social integration problems given that the former East German populace lived in a society where everything was provided by the state, including a job for life. But I am not sure that they recognized the extent of their differences. To attack these social problems, the German government has gotten more involved in directing the economy than ever before in its history. According to Norbert Walker, chief economist of the Deutsche Bank, even the West German "social achievements such as six weeks vacation, a shorter working week and early retirement will have to be jettisoned for a transitional period."⁴⁸ On the other hand, eastern Germans have really never experienced unemployment, and are just now getting a taste of the reality of a market economy. Walter Momper, Mayor of Berlin, once said, " It will take quite a long time to be a state with one people who really understand each other."⁴⁹ Obviously, the path to successfully merging these two distinct societies is to build a strong economy in both eastern and western Germany. That is exactly what the

Germans are doing; but it will take some time to achieve, and along the way social disparities and frictions will continue.

With reunification, probably the most daunting task facing the Germans, aside from the economy itself, is the environmental clean-up of eastern Germany. As one environmentalist put it, "four decades of unbridled industrial spewing and spilling in East Germany have created an acute crisis for man and nature."⁵⁰ The enormity of the environmental disaster in eastern Germany is beyond comprehension, requiring a massive effort to clean-up East Germany's polluted rivers, soil, forests, and air.⁵¹ After an initial review of the crisis, some environmental specialists "have compared the challenge ahead to restoring a country after chemical warfare."⁵² To correct the pollution problem, the government intends to dismantle many obsolete, polluting factories and investigate nearly 15,000 toxic waste dumps. The clean up is expected to take the next decade and billions of marks.⁵³

To avoid future problems, the government enacted legislation in 1990 requiring all new industrial firms in eastern Germany to comply with west Germany's strict environmental requirements. For existing plants and vehicles, a transition period will be allowed to meet these new environmental standards. An example of the effects of the East German communists' drive for production regardless of the environmental cost, is sulfur dioxide - the most toxic by-product of burned coal. It was recently disclosed that East Germany was the largest per capita producer of sulfur dioxide in the world where "16 million people hurl 5.2 million

tons of coal pollutant into the air every year, compared with West Germany's 60 million people who annually emit 3 million tons."⁵⁴ The primary difference is not consumption, but the type of coal used, and the industrial processes which consume the coal. For example, "70 percent of East Germany's energy is derived from lignite, or soft coal... and so the most obvious pollution problem is a sharp-smelling dirty haze that hangs over the country."⁵⁵ As you might expect, East Germans have not escaped the health hazards which come with such pollution. They "complain of afflictions of the skin, lungs, eyes and bones, and...that the growth of their children is stunted."⁵⁶ Another example is East German cars: They are obsolete and use a highly-polluting gas/oil mix for fuel dumping " up to 20 times the pollutants into the air as modern Western autos. Acid rain has killed parts of forests...and some of the surrounding farmlands have had too many pesticides sprayed on them, poisoning the soil."⁵⁷

According to Hocken Hücke, a director of research for the West German Federal Ministry of the Environment, the major factor in east German pollution is inefficiency in industry. He points out that on average, East German factories use twice the amount of energy necessary to produce the same output.⁵⁸

What will it take to clean up this mess? Apparently no one knows for sure, but the German Institute for Economic Research estimates it will cost at least \$200 billion over the next 20 years to recover. The same institute suggests that the money

will come from both government and industry, but that ultimately the consumers will have to foot the bill. In addition, the Treuhand is offering purchasers of East German plants relief from liability for existing environmental damage.

Guestworkers And Refugees

Since reunification, the issues of "guestworkers" and refugees has grown in importance. Since World War II, Germany has always had a sizable foreigner population to augment the German labor shortage. There are nearly two million foreigners (guestworkers) residing in Germany with a population of 78 million. Most of these "guestworkers" are Turkish and Yugoslavian, but many other minorities are in country as well. Germans are especially concerned about the large numbers of Croats who comprise the second largest guestworker population and with over 30,000 relatives a month arriving in Germany as asylum seekers this winter. Little wonder, then, that Germany pushed for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia.⁵⁹

Beyond the "guestworker" population, Germany is now experiencing large numbers of political asylum seekers entering the country at an alarming rate. One estimate places their number at 200,000 asylum seekers by the end of 1991.⁶⁰ With the collapse of the eastern European economies, many of these asylum seekers are from those countries; and, despite claims of political

asylum, most are really economic refugees. The Germans fear that huge masses of eastern Europeans may attempt to migrate to Germany, given the continuing depressing economic conditions in Eastern Europe.⁶¹

The combination of a sizable "guestworker" population and large numbers of refugees entering the country, is a concern of many Germans; and they wish the foreigners to leave. A result of this problem, which of course is exacerbated by German unemployment due to reunification economic measures, is more and more foreigner "bashing" taking place, with a racist and nationalistic fervor not seen for years.

To counter the asylum seeker problem, the German government has opened refugee camps. Furthermore, Bonn has considered a possible change to the constitution to tighten its very liberal asylum law. Presently, Germany has no policy, but does allow ethnic Germans from abroad and anyone showing up at the border claiming political asylum to enter the country.

In our interview, the SPD's Dieter Dettke, agreed that there was German political concern over foreigner "bashing" by Neo-Nazis and others, but insisted that the government had taken sufficient measures to calm the situation. As for the refugee problem in general, Mr. Dettke believes that the worst is over and that increasing numbers of refugees (political asylum seekers) are unlikely, given he and his party feel that the eastern European countries are slowly making a positive economic turnaround. Consequently, he believes neither the SPD or CDU/CSU

parties feel the need to make any constitutional changes now or in the future.⁶² Other observers feel such changes are necessary and that the parties will use the respite from state elections in the next year to achieve a non-partisan consensus. Only time will tell who is correct in this matter.

Nationalism, Patriotism And Europeanism

As one might expect, with reunification, a somewhat more self-confident, nationalistic Germany is emerging. From anyone's perspective, but especially the Germans, you would expect it to be natural now for the German people to demonstrate more nationalistic and patriotic tendencies. This is especially true in the case of Germans who since World War II, have had their youth grow up with really no patriotic holiday to celebrate.⁶³

But while Germans attempt to re-look at, and in some cases, celebrate their history, non-German Europeans and others worry about a more nationalistic united Germany.⁶⁴ An example which highlights the dilemma confronting the Germans, was the 1990 reburial of Frederick the Great in Potsdam. Although Frederick is considered by many Germans and others as the greatest Prussian leader in history and a liberal of the Enlightenment; some consider his legacy to be dangerous because of its association with militarism and expansionism.⁶⁵

The controversy serves to highlight the problem for the Germans. Some think such celebrations of historic events or

persons are "necessary to build a healthy sense of history and pride in Germany ...[while] critics view [such celebrations] as dangerously nationalistic."⁶⁶

Dieter Dettke argues that German nationalism is not a threat to its neighbors and that Germans, more than any other Europeans, are advocates for less nationalism and more Europeanism. He contends that Germans are fully aware of their checkered past and, as a result, are sensitive to concerns of their neighbors. Dettke does not foresee German preoccupation with its past or with its present economic turmoil. On the contrary, he envisions a Germany striving for a more integrated Europe through the European Community, CSCE and other institutions. He sees Germany's future intertwined with Europe's future as a whole, and not as a strong belligerent power in Central Europe which threatens its neighbors.⁶⁷ In this, he echoes Thomas Mann's hope for a European Germany rather than a German Europe.

Looking Eastward

In the past, West Germany was always a major trading partner with Eastern Europe, but since reunification, Germany is now without question the most important trading partner for most East European countries. This is due, in part, to the high volume of trade that East Germany had with other East European countries; and now the unified Germany has simply inherited that trade position, supplying, among other things, spare parts for East German products sold earlier.⁶⁸

For example, since reunification, German exports to the East have doubled from four percent to eight percent. Also, in 1990, German firms accounted for 59 percent of the acquisitions and 38 percent of the joint ventures made by foreigners in Eastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union, four times that of the next highest competitor-France.⁶⁹ In addition, Germany has guaranteed the exports from former East German companies to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the next 10 years.⁷⁰

Beyond trade, Germany has led the Western world in developing "a comprehensive Western program for economic reconstruction and development in Eastern Europe."⁷¹ Germany has supplied about one third of the total financial aid rendered, amounting to over \$15 billion for Poland and Hungary and \$4 billion for other East Central European states.⁷²

Additionally, Germany is working daily with the other EC countries to strengthen their ties with the East. In this regard, Foreign Minister Genscher has constantly reminded the EC that it should represent the whole of Europe not just the West European community. These ties include trade and cooperation agreements, offering financial support from the European Investment Bank, providing expertise on a wide range of areas from telecommunications, banking, research and development, to the environment, and to increased political cooperation at the highest levels.⁷³

Over and above all of the cooperative efforts, however, is the paramount concern over the economic collapse of the former

Soviet Union. What Germany fears most is the possibility of hundreds of thousands of economic refugees from the Soviet Republics migrating to Germany in search of a job. To counter that possibility, Germany has plowed billions of dollars in financial and material aid into the former Soviet Republics. Some estimate that "Germany contributed 80 percent of Western aid to the (former) Soviet Union in 1990. The Germans have already committed at least \$23 billion in multiyear support...through food aid, tied and untied loans, subsidies enabling the (former) Soviets to buy European food surpluses, credit guarantees and payments to support, move, house and retrain the estimated five hundred thousand (former) Soviet soldiers and their dependents still stationed in eastern Germany."⁷⁴

To further German-(former) Soviet cooperation, each signed a 20 year friendship treaty forming a new political and economic alliance between the two. "It pledged that neither side will use force against the other; that both will 'honor without reservation the territory of all European states in their current borders;' that 'should one of the two sides be attacked the other side will make available no military help to the aggressor;' and that both will seek 'binding, effective and verifiable agreements for significant reductions in armed forces and armaments, to attain a stable balance at low levels, especially in Europe, suitable for defense but not for attack.' The friendship treaty, which some cynics view as the price for reunification, also calls

for a rapid increase in trade between the two countries as well as technological exchanges."⁷⁵

Moreover, in 1990 a Four Power agreement, consisting of a nine point package, resulted in the former Soviet Union agreeing to a united Germany in NATO, provided certain conditions were met. Some of these conditions include:

- "1) A united Germany will not develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
- 2) After concluding a conventional arms reduction treaty, negotiations will begin to limit the size of Germany's military (later agreed to 370,000 maximum).
- 3) NATO is prepared to advance the date for negotiating limits to short-range nuclear weapons in Europe (since then, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Germany).
- 4) Germany will renounce claims not only to Polish territory but also to former German territory now in the Soviet Union (such as East Prussia)[since then Germany has signed separate agreements renouncing any territorial claims].
- 5) No NATO forces will be stationed in what was East Germany.
- 6) Soviet troops can remain in East Germany for a transition period, with expenses paid by the German government (since then, agreement reached to have all former Soviet troops out by 1994).
- 7) Germany will offer Moscow a variety of trade, lending, and commercial arrangements to help the former Soviet Union in its transition to a market economy (since then, agreement reached in a number of areas including German payment of eight billion dollars to move, house, and retrain former Soviet soldiers in Germany)."⁷⁶

Thus, in some respects, the newly sovereign united Germany still has restrictions on its sovereignty.

Implications For The U.S.

In light of such considerations, what should the United States do with respect to Germany and its potential to be an economic and military superpower in the next decade?

Ignoring the German situation is a valid and even realistic option for national security decisionmakers. Germany is already a strong democratic republic, a prominent member of the United Nations (UN), the European Community (EC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Therefore, the United States could "leave well enough alone," and let Germany take its own course in European and world affairs without United States pressure one way or another.

On the other hand, maybe what the United States should do is to adopt a policy toward Germany which seeks to maintain and expand Germany's involvement in Europe and the world. This requires more direct and indirect involvement of the United States in German affairs; but it is a practical approach to this emerging superpower. Also, this approach affords us greater opportunity to influence Germany in the future; to ensure that the "Fatherland" does not drift toward either isolationism or neutrality, or to some extreme position in opposition to American national interests. Such an approach was applauded by the SPD's Dettke, who firmly believes that Germany absolutely needs U.S. presence in Europe, especially NATO and the CSCE. Why? According to Dettke, because the very presence of the United States in Europe lessens the worry of Germany's neighbors about a

"strong" Germany, which, in turn, allows the Germans more freedom of movement. If the U.S. were not present in Europe, many German actions might be viewed differently by its neighbors, thereby elevating tension throughout the continent. What Dettke fears is that under the latter scenario Germany could become defensive and isolationist. And that outcome could truly be cause for real fear among other countries.⁷⁷

What, then, is the correct course for the United States to pursue in its relationship with Germany, in order to satisfy our national interests and accommodate Germany's desire to be an autonomous, successful country pursuing its own national interests?

While Germany today is not a threat to United States national security interests, it could be in a decade or two. The United States should seek to promote active involvement by Germany in world affairs to minimize that possibility. This would best ensure harmonious national interests between Germany and the United States. Dettke asserts that the major German political parties-SPD, CDU, CSU, and FDP-are, for the most part, highly supportive of greater global involvement on the part of Germany, including the possible future use of German troops outside of Europe under the auspices of the United Nations. He believes Germany is coming around to the idea that, commensurate with its political and economic power, it has a responsibility to the rest of the world to provide help, where needed, in out-of-

area conflicts, including sending troops - not under a NATO flag, but a UN flag.⁷⁸

Given Germany's domestic challenges arising from reunification, the pressure of asylum seekers, and guestworkers, and a resurgent nationalism, one could argue that Germany will be far too busy to ever be a threat to any other country, least of all, the United States. While I do not disagree with this premise, I am convinced that Germany will overcome its pressing domestic problems in the next few years.⁷⁹ If that premise is correct, the United States must be prepared for the Germany that will have emerged. It appears to me that the correct policy for the U.S. is one which supports German Europeanism and participation in world affairs, so that, when Germany emerges, it will more likely be a teamplayer on the world's playing field. Such a policy requires continued U.S. presence in Europe and NATO, avoiding isolationism for both the U.S. and Germany. The challenge is great, but the United States is capable of meeting this challenge. As Dieter Dettke said, "If you're [U.S.] still a world power, act like it."⁸⁰ As for Germany's part, Daniel Hamilton sums it up quite well:

There has been a notable lack of national euphoria at the opportunity to reforge the German nation or the European continent. While hopes are high, the mood is sober, guided by a sensitivity to historic German excesses, an underlying current of concern about sacrifices and setbacks almost certainly to come and a quiet anxiety over whether those West German and European institutions that had anchored German democracy and secured West European prosperity during decades of division can meet the challenges

posed by German and European unification. The record of the past 40 years gives cause for cautious optimism.⁸¹

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